Revision Games

Asynchronous Revision Games ∗

We consider situations where players prepare their actions before playing a game. Prepared actions are mutually observable, and opportunities to revise prepared actions arrive stochastically, by independent Poisson processes (one for each player). We show that the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path can be characterized by an optimal control problem. Using this result, we examine what hap...

Belief Revision Games

Belief revision games (BRGs) are concerned with the dynamics of the beliefs of a group of communicating agents. BRGs are “zero-player” games where at each step every agent revises her own beliefs by taking account for the beliefs of her acquaintances. Each agent is associated with a belief state defined on some finite propositional language. We provide a general definition for such games where ...

Coherent Belief Revision in Games

Dynamics of Rule Revision and Strategy Revision in Legislative Games

Many legislative games of interest defy classical assumptions and techniques; they tend to be open-ended, with weakly defined objectives, and either noncompetitive or pseudo-competitive. We introduce a conceptual and mathematical framework for grappling with such systems. Simulation results are presented for basic specifications of the framework that exhibit a number of qualitative phenomena ov...

On Opinion Control in Belief Revision Games

We consider the problem of belief propagation in a network of communicating agents, modeled in the recently introduced Belief Revision Game (BRG) framework. In this setting, each agent expresses her belief through a propositional formula and revises her own belief at each step by considering the beliefs of her acquaintances, using belief change tools. We study the extent to which BRGs satisfy s...