Reversibility and oscillations in zero-sum discounted stochastic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reversibility and Oscillations in Zero-sum Discounted Stochastic Games
We show that by coupling two well-behaved exit-time problems one can construct two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space having oscillating discounted values. This unifies and generalizes recent examples due to Vigeral (2013) and Ziliotto (2013).
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Dynamics and Games
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2164-6066
DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2015.2.103