Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, kand k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare vers...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.005