Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counter-intuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005