Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
Along with substantial progress made recently in designing near-optimal mechanisms for multiitem auctions, interesting structural questions have also been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general s...
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In combinatorial auctions that use VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders (see e.g. [5]). In our previous work [26], we showed that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” occur under an extremely broad range of deterministic strategyproof combinatorial auction mechanisms, even when bidders have “known single-minded” valuations. In this work we consider the question of...
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In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counter-intuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGecom Exchanges
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1551-9031,1551-9031
DOI: 10.1145/1345037.1345048