Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

سال: 2018

ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383

DOI: 10.1145/3274647