Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling
Companies in a variety of industries (e.g., airlines, hotels, theaters) often use last-minute sales to dispose of unsold capacity. Although this may generate incremental revenues in a short term, the long-term consequences of such a strategy are not immediately obvious: more discounted last-minute tickets may lead to more consumers anticipating the discount and delaying the purchase rather than...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1125