منابع مشابه
Revenue equivalence revisited
The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first...
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The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenu...
متن کاملRevenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
متن کاملMonotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanisms where overreporting the budget is not possible. In several settings, reporting larger budgets can be made suboptimal with a small randomiz...
متن کاملMechanism design without revenue equivalence
We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization based on the familiar Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. These conditions pin down the rang...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.003