Retraction: Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Accounting Review
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0001-4826,1558-7967
DOI: 10.2308/accr-10457