Retracted:When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration
Sell-side analysts are compensated, at least in part, by brokerage commissions. These commissions create an incentive to bias forecasts to generate trade. Thus, analysts have clear economic incentives to deceive and traders have economic incentives to detect deception. Prior analytical theories of information transmission games starkly predict that there will always be some deception (with trad...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Contemporary Accounting Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0823-9150
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01006.x