Residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks of lightweight ciphers cryptography competition finalists

The protection of communications between Internet Things (IoT) devices is great concern because the information exchanged contains vital sensitive data. Malicious agents seek to exploit those data extract secret about owners or system. Power side channel attacks are on these their power consumption unintentionally leaks correlatable device's Several studies have demonstrated effectiveness authenticated encryption with advanced data, in protecting devices. A comprehensive evaluation seven (out 10) algorithm finalists National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST) IoT lightweight cipher competition that do not integrate built-in countermeasures proposed. study shows that, nonetheless, they still present some residual vulnerabilities (SCA). For five ciphers, an attack methodology as well leakage function needed perform correlation analysis (CPA) authors assert Ascon, Sparkle, PHOTON-Beetle security vulnerability can generally be assessed assumptions “Chosen ciphertext only, nonce-misuse resilience adversary (CCAmL1)” only nonce-respecting (CCAL1)”, respectively. However, GIFT-COFB, Grain, Romulus, TinyJambu evaluated more straightforwardly publicly available models solvers. They also simply by increasing number traces collected launch attack.