منابع مشابه
Residual Deterrence ∗
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light o...
متن کاملBid deterrence
In a second-price auction with costly bidding, bidders can deter others from participating by publicly pre-committing to bid. Such “bid deterrence” increases total welfare when the reserve price is given, but allows the seller to increase expected revenue when the seller can pre-commit to a reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.
متن کاملThe dynamics of deterrence.
Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by "tipping" a situation from its high-violation equili...
متن کاملStrategic Bypass Deterrence∗
In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. ...
متن کاملUncertainty and entry deterrence*
We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deter rence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy034