Reserve prices as reference points – Evidence from auctions for football players at Hattrick.org
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
We study a model in which the same set of bidders, with perfectly correlated valuations across units, compete for two units of a good in two sequential ascending-price auctions. The seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction. Surprisingly, the equilibrium has a simple structure; strategic nondisclosure of information (i.e., pooling) only takes the form of non-participation...
متن کاملPrior-free Auctions without Reserve Prices
We consider the optimal prior-free auction design for allocating a set of indistinguishable items to a set ofbuyers where the objective is to maximize seller’s revenue. The key design requirement is that the auction must always fullyallocate all items to buyers, which prevents using the traditional approach based on reserve prices. This is an important class ofauctions both in theor...
متن کاملMixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices
Revenue maximization in multi-item settings is notoriously elusive. This paper studies a class of two-item auctions which we call a mixed-bundling auction with reserve prices (MBARP). It calls VCG on an enlarged set of agents by adding the seller—who has reserve valuations for each bundle of items—and a fake agent who receives nothing nor has valuations for any item or bundle, but has a valuati...
متن کاملTimber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices
This paper analyses first-price sealed-bid auctions of standing timber organized by the French Forest Service, Office National des Forests (ONF). A particular feature of these auctions is that they are held with random reserve prices. We consider an auction model with a random reserve price within the independent private value paradigm. After establishing the identification of the model, we est...
متن کاملA Non-parametric Estimator for Reserve Prices in Procurement Auctions
Electronic auction markets collect large amounts of auction field data. This enables a structural estimation of the bid distributions and the possibility to derive optimal reserve prices. In this paper we propose a new approach to setting reserve prices. In contrast to traditional auction theory we use the buyer’s risk statement for getting a winning bid as a key criterion to set an optimal res...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Psychology
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2009.08.004