Research on the Allocation of Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights in Venture Capital Financing Contract

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Research on the Allocation of Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights in Venture Capital Financing Contract

In view of the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights in venture capital firms, a financing contract model is set up by introducing the entrepreneur’s self-owned capital in this paper. This paper analyzes the affecting factors and mechanism to the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights, shows the relationship between cash flow rights and control rights, gives the bargain i...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Modern Economy

سال: 2012

ISSN: 2152-7245,2152-7261

DOI: 10.4236/me.2012.31008