Research on Behavioral Decision-Making of Subjects on Cultivated Land Conservation under the Goal of Carbon Neutrality

Protecting cultivated land is an urgent mitigation measure for China to reconcile the contradiction between food safety and carbon neutrality. In context of neutrality, this paper constructs evolutionary game model among local governments, agricultural technology service organizations (ATSOs), farmers based on China’s black land, discusses factors influencing strategy choice each stakeholder group final form stabilization strategies adopted by from perspective extension. Through numerical simulations, we reveal that two stable situations exist in current state protection China: full subject participation government only. order achieve optimal realization dynamic equilibrium three parties, identify key issues (CLP) put forward reasonable suggestions, which are summarized as follows: (1) prohibit excessive subsidies farmers, keep appropriate at 100~140 CNY/mu help if more than 140 not conducive governments CLP (mu, a Chinese unit measurement equals 1/15 hectare); (2) increase farmers’ fines has dampening effect digging soil, achieves ideal when it reaches 10 billion CNY, can be implemented long-term policy; (3) maintaining incentive fund 5 CNY provides greatest ATSOs promote low-carbon technologies (LCAT), while production trusteeship no beneficial impact ATSOs; (4) reducing costs increasing charges most effective way incentivizing LCAT. This means fee maintained 400 cost reduced 308 CNY/mu. study reveals inner mechanism CLP, theoretical basis promotion technology, proposes aiming improve overall implementation