Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Product differentiation, price discrimination and collusion
The existing literaturewhich analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discr...
متن کاملR & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion
It is shown that R & D joint ventures make it more likely that firms will be able to sustain tacit product-market collusion, all else equal. JEL classification: LI3; 032
متن کاملOn the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion
Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation ...
متن کاملResearch Joint Ventures and Price Collusion: Joint Analysis of the Impact of R&D Subsidies and Antitrust Fines
This paper analyzes the joint design of innovation and competition policy. It focuses on collusion sustainability changes due to implementation of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies in an extension of a model by Miyagiwa (2009). Generic subsidies for R&D are found not to facilitate collusion, while additional subsidization to research joint ventures (RJVs) can be collusion facilitating. We also ...
متن کاملSymmetric Research Joint Ventures
We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nest...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00082-5