Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Oligopoly price discrimination and resale price maintenance
Oligopoly price discrimination in the retail market prevents a manufacturer from inducing optimal retail margins through any wholesale price. This motivates the manufacturer to impose resale price maintenance. In a model of third-degree price discrimination by rival retailers, a retail price ceiling (or floor) enables the manufacturer to restore the first best. Imposing a fixed retail price is ...
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The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers’ information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus d...
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Proponents of RPM argue that RPM helps to sustain a high level of service at the point of sale and that such a high level is efficient. This paper provides a simple model which leads to the following conclusions: 1) RPM may increase or decrease the level of service. 2) Whether the service level is more efficient under RPM does not depend on the fact that service increases due to RPM. It may be ...
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An upstream manufacturer can use minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors. RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers. If entry is accommodated by retailers, upstream competition leads to fierce downstream competition and the breakdown of RPM. Thus, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent’s profits. ...
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This research studies a case where there are two manufacturers producing competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The consumer demand depends on two factors: (1) retail price, and (2) service level provided by the manufacturer. Game-theoretic framework is applied to obtained the equilibrium solutions for every entities. This article studies and compares results from three ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140280