Reputational concerns with altruistic providers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputational concerns with altruistic providers.
We study a model of reputational concerns when doctors differ in their degree of altruism and they can signal their altruism by their (observable) quality. When reputational concerns are high, following the introduction or enhancement of public reporting, the less altruistic (bad) doctor mimics the more altruistic (good) doctor. Otherwise, either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium ar...
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Many studies show that people act cooperatively and are willing to punish free riders (i.e., people who are less cooperative than others). However, nonpunishers benefit when free riders are punished, making punishment a group-beneficial act. Presented here are four studies investigating whether punishers gain social benefits from punishing. Undergraduate participants played public goods games (...
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Reputational Concerns in Political Agency Models Andrew Yuichi Lemon 2005 Citizens in democracies can be thought of as hiring politicians to run the government. In this sense, elections are contracts. The citizens are the principals and retain politicians as agents who are responsible for making policy decisions. Provided politicians value holding office in the future, elections generate incent...
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I develop a model in which analysts strategically time and exaggerate their forecasts to convince the public that they are skilled. The model’s key predictions are that an analyst will tend to forecast later if he has a better ex ante reputation, and he will tend to forecast earlier if the quality of public information is lower. Using a database of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts, I emp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Health Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-6296
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.003