منابع مشابه
Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games
The paper analyzes reputation effects in general perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure or mixed) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium payoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. ...
متن کاملEndogenous Reputation in Repeated Games
Reputation is often modelled by a small but positive prior probability that a player is a “behavioral type” in repeated games. This paper investigates the source of this reputation by allowing two fully rational, equally patient players in a standard infinitely repeated game to commit privately to any behavioral strategy they wish at the beginning of the game. Even with forward induction restri...
متن کاملBayesian repeated games and reputation
The folk theorem characterizes the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium payo¤s of an undiscounted or discounted in nitely repeated game with fully informed, patient players as the feasible individually rational payo¤s of the one-shot game. To which extent does the result still hold when every player privately knows his own payo¤s ? Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishm...
متن کاملReputation without Commitment in Finitely-repeated Games
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalen...
متن کاملReputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games*
We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0060