Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions - An Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
RUHR ECONOMIC PAPERS Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions
This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions. JEL Classifi cation: D44, D83, L14
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Reputation is an important organization asset, particularly in the era of ecommerce. In an online consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auction market, a trader’s reputation sends an important signal to his trading partners in their decision-making, due to the nature of the anonymous transaction process. While prior research has shown that reputation systems, such as eBay’s
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The need for new procurement auction mechanisms that allow for rich bid types such as bundle bids on multiple items has been raised in many situations in industrial procurement. In addition to strategic problems, the design of these combinatorial auctions exhibits hard computational problems. For example, the winner determination typically leads to NP-hard allocation problems in combinatorial a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1832326