منابع مشابه
Reputation and Imperfect Information
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that in multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated priso...
متن کاملInformation Reputation
In this paper we describe the design of a reputation framework for an information management system under active development. The integration of a reputation framework with an IMS is a novel combination that can produce a distinctly more e↵ective business intelligence tool.
متن کاملReputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finit...
متن کاملInformation Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
We study reputation games where a long-lived player with a possible commitment type faces a sequence of short-lived players who must pay to observe the long-lived players past behavior. In this costly information model we show that equilibrium behavior is cyclical. The long-lived player builds her reputation up only to exploit it; then builds it up again, and so on. We call this behavior reput...
متن کاملImperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism∗
The modern world is complex and difficult to understand for voters, who may hold beliefs that are at variance with reality. Politicians face incentives to pander to voters’ beliefs to get reelected. We analyze the welfare effects of this pandering and show that it comes along with both costs and benefits. Moreover, we explore optimal constitutional design in the presence of imperfect informatio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1982
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8