Repurchase Options in the Market for Lemons
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
the test for adverse selection in life insurance market: the case of mellat insurance company
انتخاب نامساعد یکی از مشکلات اساسی در صنعت بیمه است. که ابتدا در سال 1960، توسط روتشیلد واستیگلیتز مورد بحث ومطالعه قرار گرفت ازآن موقع تاکنون بسیاری از پژوهشگران مدل های مختلفی را برای تجزیه و تحلیل تقاضا برای صنعت بیمه عمر که تماما ناشی از عدم قطعیت در این صنعت میباشد انجام داده اند .وهدف از آن پیدا کردن شرایطی است که تحت آن شرایط انتخاب یا کنار گذاشتن یک بیمه گزار به نفع و یا زیان شرکت بیمه ...
15 صفحه اولTrading Dynamics in the Market for Lemons
We present a dynamic model of trading under adverse selection. A seller faces a sequence of randomly arriving buyers. Each buyer receives a noisy signal about the quality of the asset and offers a price. We show that there is generically a unique equilibrium and characterize the resulting trading dynamics. Buyers’ beliefs about the quality of the asset gradually increase or decrease over time, ...
متن کاملEndogenous Market Segmentation for Lemons
Information asymmetry between sellers and buyers often impedes socially desirable trade. This paper presents a new mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry. It is shown that markets under severe adverse selection can be endogenously segmented and such segmentation improves social welfare. Endogenous segmentation is driven by low-quality sellers’ incentive to a...
متن کاملA Market for Lemons: Maize in Kenya*
Information asymmetries are a well-recognized impediment to market efficiency. When quality is not observable by prospective buyers, the quality of marketed goods will suffer, and the volume of trade will be depressed. Using data from more than 2,000 maize samples collected in four Kenyan provinces, we show that the presence of aflatoxin, an invisible and dangerous fungal contaminant, is not re...
متن کاملInformation and the market for lemons
This article revisits Akerlof’s (1970) classic adverse-selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the “buyer’s curse,” thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3677573