منابع مشابه
Repeated Games with Observation Costs
This paper analyzes repeated games in which it is possible for players to observe the other players’ past actions without noise but it is costly. One’s observation decision itself is not observable to the other players, and this private nature of monitoring activity makes it difficult to give the players proper incentives to monitor each other. We provide a sufficient condition for a feasible p...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring
We study two modi cations of the standard model of repeated games with public signals. In one modi cation, players osberve an underlying public signal at random and privately known times, where the public signals are Poisson events and either the observations occur within a small epsilon time interval or the obsevations have an exponential waiting times. In the second modi cation, the players o...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Forgetful Players∗
We present a model to investigate the behavior of forgetful players in infinitely repeated games. We assume that each player may forget the entire history of the play with a fixed probability. Our modeling specifications make a clear distinction between absentminded and forgetful players. We consider two extreme cases regarding the correlation of forgetfulness of the players. In the first case,...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Uncertain Outcomes∗
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex-post equilibrium (PPXE), and show that it can be characterized with an extension of the techniques used to study perfect public equil...
متن کاملRepeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
We present a relatively general model of repeated games first, which will be later specialized for each different repeated game with different monitoring structure. Stage game is a standard strategic (normal) form game G = {N,A, g} , where N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, Ai is player i’s finite or compact action set ¡ A = Q i∈N Ai ¢ , and g : A→ <n is the payoff functions of n players...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.004