Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated contests with asymmetric information
The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to ones type and can therefore inuence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if e¤ort is observable, this can induce a ratchet e¤ect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little e¤ort in an early round in order to make the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics and Politics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0954-1985,1468-0343
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00071