منابع مشابه
Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids
We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.
متن کاملRent-Seeking and Innovation
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of in...
متن کاملForeign aid and rent - seeking *
Why has the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid seemingly been so poor? Is there a relationship between the widespread level of corruption and other types of rent-seeking activities and concessional assistance? To answer these questions we provide a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model. The model has a number of implications. First, under certain circumstances, an increase in government rev...
متن کاملInuencing rent-seeking contests
This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants e¤ort costs can lead to an increase in total e¤ort. In asymmetric settings, this levels the playing eldand therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total e¤ort may thus wish to make rent-seeking more di¢ cult. ...
متن کاملSequential rent seeking ∗
We consider n firms which choose rent-seeking expenditures sequentially, each player anticipating the rent-seeking expenditures that will be made by later movers. We find that the earlier movers need not make larger profits than later movers, and that aggregate profits are lower than in a game in which firms make simultaneous moves.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0931-8658
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-002-0600-7