Rent-Seeking, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fractionalization, Rent Seeking, and Economic Freedom
Diversity is often thought to create conflict and harm economic institutions. We hypothesize, however, that the impact of diversity is conditional on political institutions, and may be negative in some settings but positive in others, due to differences in the nature of rent seeking in different regimes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of diversity on economic freedom, condition...
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This paper shows that free trade reduces the welfare of a small country with unemployment unless the free trade price if the importable falls below the autarky equivalent price. A decline in the price of the importable from the autarky level not only improves the terms of trade but also reduces employment and production in the importable sector. A numerical example illustrates that the autarky ...
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In a reciprocal market model with imperfectly competitive firms, domestic policies will differ across countries that are economically and politically diverse. We explore the implications of this standard result with regard to harmonization of environmental policies between corrupt and non-corrupt countries. Imposing a more stringent policy on a non-corrupt government will be welfare reducing to...
متن کاملRent-Seeking and Innovation
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Modern Economy
سال: 2011
ISSN: 2152-7245,2152-7261
DOI: 10.4236/me.2011.21005