منابع مشابه
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction
The winner-take-all nature of all-pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equil...
متن کاملRent seeking games with tax evasion
We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs. Mathematics Subject Classification: 34K18, 47N10; Jel Classification: C61, C62, H26
متن کاملAn All-Pay Auction Approach to Reallocation
The auction has been advocated as a valuable metaphor in the design of decentralized mechanisms for various problems. The walrasian auction was proposed as a suitable mechanism for resource reallocation in distributed planning. Economic theory ooers ample opportunities to develop distributed walrasian mechanisms for reallocation in \mar-kets" with many agents and innnitely divisible resources. ...
متن کاملDiscrete All-Pay Bidding Games
In an all-pay auction, only one bidder wins but all bidders must pay the auctioneer. All-pay bidding games arise from attaching a similar bidding structure to traditional combinatorial games to determine which player moves next. In contrast to the established theory of single-pay bidding games, optimal play involves choosing bids from some probability distribution that will guarantee a minimum ...
متن کاملThe all-pay auction when a committee awards the prize*
There is very little work on the equilibrium of the all-pay auction when the prize is awarded by two or more people. I consider an all-pay auction under committee administration with caps on the bids of the contestants. I show that for any number of committee members and contestants, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the contestants bid an amount equal to a suitably chosen cap. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2556781