Rent Building, Rent Sharing - A Panel Country-Industry Empirical Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cross-Country Policy Harmonization with Rent-Seeking
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2022926