Rent a womb: Surrogate selection, investment incentives and contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
Disclosure by firms would seem to reduce the informational asymmetry that causes investment inefficiency in firms. However, the effect of disclosure is subtle, especially when the link between disclosure and firm value is endogenous and depends on incentives within the firm. We analyze various disclosure regimes and determine which ones are effective in a model with optimal renegotiationproof c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.003