منابع مشابه
Renegotiation in Repeated Games*
In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other(s). If players can renegotiate after a defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that recognizes this fact, and show that in many games the prospect of renegotiation strictly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be ...
متن کاملRenegotiation in Repeated Games
The huge multiplicity of equilibria given by the folk theorem motivates an obvious question: whywould players “deliberately” select on equilibria with bad outcomes if “better” equilibria are available? A simple answer to this is that individual rationality (along with the common knowledge of the game and strategic beliefs) does not take us further than equilibrium behavior. In particular, it do...
متن کاملSubgame-perfection in free transition games
We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0, in a class of multi-player games with perfect information, which we call free transition games. The novelty is that a non-trivial class of perfect information games is solved for subgameperfection, with multiple non-terminating actions, in which the payoff structure is generally not semi-continuous. Due to the lack of s...
متن کاملRenegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments
We consider repeated games with side-payments: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the common discount factor high enough, then a strongly renegotiation–proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of Farrell and Maskin exists. As the discount factor goes to 1, the set of SRP payoffs converges to the set of e...
متن کاملA Note on , , Renegotiation in Repeated Games ” [ Games Econ . Behav .
In Farrell and Maskin (1989), the authors present sufficient conditions for weakly renegotiation-proof payoffs in their Theorem 1 (p. 332). We show that a step in the proof of this theorem is not correct by giving a counterexample. Nevertheless, the sufficient conditions remain true, and we offer a correction of the proof.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Game Theory
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2356-6930,2314-6559
DOI: 10.1155/2014/742508