Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Private Information, Limited Commitment, and Risk Sharing∗
We consider an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each of whom is subject to idiosyncratic endowment shocks. We study efficient allocations subject to two constraints: limited enforcement of financial contracts, and private information about the predictable component of the future endowment process. In our economy the immiseration result, common in this literature, does not hold, and ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Business Research
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2198-3402,2198-2627
DOI: 10.1007/s40685-017-0050-2