منابع مشابه
Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm’s technology, the compl...
متن کاملPeer firms in relative performance evaluation
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the fi...
متن کاملFirm characteristics, total quality management, and financial performance
This paper uses a sample of quality award winners to empirically test hypotheses that relate changes in operating income associated with effective implementation of total quality management (TQM) to various firm characteristics. The characteristics examined are firm size, the degree of capital intensity, the degree of diversification, the timing of TQM implementation, and the maturity of the pr...
متن کاملIntra-firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance
Personnel economics has put forward conflicting arguments concerning the impact of increased wage dispersion within a firm on the productivity of its workers. Besides giving more incentives, bigger wage differentials might also give rise to less cooperation and more politicking amongst workers resulting in worse outcomes. We try to shed light on these issues using panel data for Austrian firms....
متن کاملFirm Risk , Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2739407