Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
There are many situations wherein a group of individuals (e.g., voters, experts, sports writers) must produce an ordered list of 'best' alternatives selected from a given group of alternatives (e.g., candidates, proposals, sports teams). Two long established mechanisms that have been used for this task are 'Zermelo's Ranking Method' (1929) and 'Borda's Voting Scheme' (1781). The main purpose of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0327-7