Relationship Compatibility, Compatible Matches, and Compatibility Matching

Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent overall stable matchings. In oneto-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mec...

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals’ preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group st...

Testosterone Reactivity is Moderated by Relationship Compatibility

Stimulus-Response Compatibility Is Information-Action Compatibility

5.2 Compatibility

27 In MultiContext systems, these compatibility relations are formalized as a special kind of inference rules, called bridge rules 11. The form of a bridge rule is the following: (12) where c i and c j are contexts and 1 ; : : :; n are formulae belonging to the language of c i and n+1 is a formula belonging to the language of c j. Semantically, the eeect of a rule like this is to put a constrai...