Relational contracts with subjective peer evaluations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity
As demonstrated in a recent laboratory experiment [see Sebald and Walzl (2014)], individuals tend to sanction others who subjectively evaluate their performance whenever this assessment falls short of the individuals’ self-evaluation. Interestingly, this is the case even if the individuals’ earnings are unaffected by the subjective performance appraisal. Hence, performance feedback which falls ...
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We show that individuals’ desire to protect their self-esteem against ego-threatening feedback can mitigate moral hazard in environments with purely subjective performance evaluations. In line with evidence from social psychology we assume that agents’ react aggressively to evaluations by the principal which do not coincide with their own positive self-perceptions and thereby generate costs of ...
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We study a T -period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent if he performs poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past, and, at the same time, the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor performance in the past by performing better in the future. Thus, optimal incen...
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We investigate the use of information in repeated principal-agent game and report three results. First, consistent with Kandori (1992), garbling signals within each period hurts the e¢ ciency of the game. Second, contrary to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), bundling signals across periods and then fully revealing them never increases the e¢ ciency of the game. Third, and most importantly, we ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12116