Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?

Abstract Hans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On one hand, he endorsed programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on other, explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown present paper view not, frequently assumed, opposed empiricism but rather positivism. A distinction without difference? Not at all, least for Reichenbach. As well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant was intended circumvent what considered shortcomings Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) language science. In Experience Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit this regard. However, I shall argue remained notoriously unstable end. oscillated between full-fledged reading an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, contribution proved instrumental preparing subsequent efforts reconciling realism.