Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Network competition in nonlinear pricing
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: (i) As long as subscription demand is inelastic, profits can remain independent of the access charge, even when customers are heterogeneous and network...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Network Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1446-9022,2194-5993
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1141