Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry
he topic of corporate governance in general, and topmanagement compensation in particular, has received enormous attention in recent years.1 Although an increasing literature has examined various aspects of the corporate governance of manufacturing firms in the United States and abroad, the corporate governance of banks and financial institutions has received relatively less focus. Alignment of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1032616