Regulation and Bankers’ Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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I model the principal-agent problem in a banking context, where the agent must not only be induced to exert costly unveri able e¤ort but also to exercise duciary discretion in lending money on behalf of an employing bank. I show that the spread in wage outcomes necessary to induce duciary discretion may be prohibitively expensive; instead, the bank may opt for a second-best solution where exc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Services Research
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0920-8550,1573-0735
DOI: 10.1007/s10693-018-0303-z