REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

Uninsurance and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance and Labor Markets

Competitive Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints

Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints, which might be due to limited capital. We show that under mild assumptions a pure strategy equil...

evidence of adverse selection in irans health insurance market

در این تحقیق به مطالعه وجود انتخاب نامساعد(کژ گزینی) در بازار بیمه درمان تکمیلی ایران پرداخته شده است. داده های مورد نیاز توسط پرسشنامه و به روش نمونه گیری خوشه ای جمع آوری شده است. پرسشنامه ها در میان افراد شاغل ساکن شهر تهران توریع شد. در این تحقیق با استفاده از تخمین دو مدل لجستیک و به دست آوردن ضریب همبستگی میان تقاضای بیمه درمان تکمیلی و رخداد خسارت به بررسی موضوع مورد نظر پرداخته شده است....

Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons’ model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to solve this major inefficiency consists of adding a partial insur...

Ambiguity Aversion in Competitive Insurance Markets: Adverse and Advantageous Selection

We analyze an extension of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model with ambiguous loss probabilities and ambiguity-averse consumers to determine whether there are adverse or advantageous selection equilibria. We show that non-increasing absolute ambiguity aversion is sufficient for adverse selection. We show generally that actuarially fair pricing is also sufficient for adverse selection and that advanta...