منابع مشابه
Regulating an observable M/M/1 queue
Naor (1969) was the first to observe that in a single-server memoryless queue, customers who inspect the queue length upon arrival and accordingly decide whether to join or not may join even if from the social point of view they are worse off. The question then is how to mechanically design the system such that customers will join only queue lengths that are advised by society, while still mind...
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This paper compares the equilibrium threshold strategies of customers with different decision criteria in an observable queue with multiple vacations. Customers are not informed of the service time distribution and the state of the server, whereas they are told that the expected service time is an alternative of two values or the variable service time belongs to an interval. We find that both t...
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The subject of this paper is a mechanism that allows customers to overtake others. In our system, customers observe the queue length upon arrival, and have the option of overtaking some or all of the customers already present in the queue. Overtaking is associated with a fixed price per overtaken customer. If a customer chooses to overtake some but not all of the present customers, he overtakes...
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The temperate phage MM1 forms stable lysogens in Streptococcus pneumoniae. We report here the first characterization of the lysogenic control region in Pneumococcus which contains two functional divergent promoters (P(R) and P(L)). MM1 encodes a 14-kDa cI protein (CI) that appears to be responsible for maintaining the lysogenic state in Pneumococcus since it prevents elongation of the transcrip...
متن کاملReordering an existing queue
We investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four axioms are incompatible in the current setup. Given this negative result, we examine the consequences of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research Letters
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0167-6377
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.002