Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder auction with additive valuation to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess reduction, can be applied to address several central questions in optimal revenue auction theory such as the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy implementations. First, when the items have indepe...
متن کاملMulti-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post efficient descending auctions for two environments: multiple non-identical items and buyers with unit-demand valuations; and multiple identical items and buyers with non-increasing marginal values. O...
متن کاملSimple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multiitem multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have additive valuations and are from the same population. Second, every bidder’s value distributions of items are independent but not necessarily identical monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions. For non-i.i.d. bidders,...
متن کاملMulti-Agent Planning with Baseline Regret Minimization
We propose a novel baseline regret minimization algorithm for multi-agent planning problems modeled as finite-horizon decentralized POMDPs. It guarantees to produce a policy that is provably at least as good as a given baseline policy. We also propose an iterative belief generation algorithm to efficiently minimize the baseline regret, which only requires necessary iterations so as to converge ...
متن کاملMulti-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multiitem auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey-English auction (J.K. Sankaran, Math. Soc. Sci. 28:143–150, 1994) and the Vickrey-Dutch auction (D. Mishra an...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3636395