Reflective Legal Positivism

The argument of theoretical disagreement has been deemed the most serious contemporary challenge to traditional views law, not merely for academic legal positivists but all lawyers and scholars. Although coined by Ronald Dworkin specific purpose opposing conventionalist positivist theories recognises general truth that jurisprudence is an inevitably agonistic enterprise. Nowadays, it one discussed arguments in jurisprudence. In this paper, I follow Shapiro’s idea have accept accommodate – they simply cannot dismiss as conceptually irrelevant. briefly reconstruct discuss three accounts phenomenon disagreement. also argue common features these positivistic responses a tacit acceptance holistic meta-philosophical perspective allows disagreements fit within boundaries legal‒institutional framework. turn no surprise given Dworkin’s methodology principio holistic. conclude, however, holistically pimped positivism being conscious close neighbour realism more reflective theory law than Dworkinian one.