Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Psychology
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2014.05.003