Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy
Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how self-interested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure of this inefficiency. We survey recent work that analyzes the price of anarchy of selfish routing. We also ...
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We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such selfish behavior typically results in some equilibrium which is not globally optimal : An equilibrium is an allocation where no user can reduce her own cost by ...
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Recently there has been a lot of interest in problems at the intersection of Game Theory, Economics, and Computer Science. For example, there are interesting developments concerning algorithms for equilibria and cost sharing, algorithmic mechanism design, and the efficiency of systems with selfish users [17]. In this note, I will focus on the last area and in particular on the price of anarchy ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2013.02.019