Redistributive taxation as social insurance

Social mobility and redistributive taxation

Social Mobility and Redistributive Taxation by Kai

We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and determine how different patterns of social mobility affect the choices of redistributional taxes. In the absence of social mobility, voters choose tax rates that are very well in line with the prediction derived in the standard framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, past or future changes in the income hiera...

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individ...

Tagging and Redistributive Taxation

We study optimal redistributive taxes when the population can be disaggregated into tagged groups. Under reasonable circumstances, the tax system will be more redistributive in the tagged group with the higher proportion of high-ability persons. We extend the analysis to the case where the tag reflects differences in resources required to achieve a given level of utility. The compensation given...

Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Sentiments

To help explain differences between the US and EU “social contracts” as well as other cultural differences, we present a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual attitudes toward others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities and their degree of social concern, and their behavior is influenced by moral standards. According to these, agents de...