Redistribution of the Market Economy

Political Economy of Redistribution∗

It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in the society makes property better protected from expropriation. We use a legislative bargainingtype model to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the eq...

The Political Economy of Redistribution under Democracy∗

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. H...

“the effect of risk aversion on the demand for life insurance: the case of iranian life insurance market”

abstract: about 60% of total premium of insurance industry is pertained?to life policies in the world; while the life insurance total premium in iran is less than 6% of total premium in insurance industry in 2008 (sigma, no 3/2009). among the reasons that discourage the life insurance industry is the problem of adverse selection. adverse selection theory describes a situation where the inf...

the test for adverse selection in life insurance market: the case of mellat insurance company

انتخاب نامساعد یکی از مشکلات اساسی در صنعت بیمه است. که ابتدا در سال 1960، توسط روتشیلد واستیگلیتز مورد بحث ومطالعه قرار گرفت ازآن موقع تاکنون بسیاری از پژوهشگران مدل های مختلفی را برای تجزیه و تحلیل تقاضا برای صنعت بیمه عمر که تماما ناشی از عدم قطعیت در این صنعت میباشد انجام داده اند .وهدف از آن پیدا کردن شرایطی است که تحت آن شرایط انتخاب یا کنار گذاشتن یک بیمه گزار به نفع و یا زیان شرکت بیمه ...

The Shifting Political Economy of Redistribution in the Indian Federation