Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Recognizing Majority-Rule Equilibrium In Spatial Voting Games
It is provably difficult (NP-complete) to determine whether a given point can be defeated in a majority-rule spatial voting game. Nevertheless, one can easily generate a point with the property that if any point cannot be defeated, then this point cannot be defeated. Our results suggest that majority-rule equilibrium can exist as a purely practical matter: when the number of voters and the dime...
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This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...
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We propose two related equilibrium re nements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make o¤ers to sev...
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We propose two related equilibrium re nements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make o¤ers to sev...
متن کاملExperiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games
In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable experimental support exists for the core as a solution hypothesis when it is not empty (Berl et al., 1976; Fiorina and Plott, 1978; Isaacs and Plott, 1978). Specifically, these experiments show that if a simple majority voting game possesses a Core point-a point that cannot be defeated by a majority vote-subjects choose outcomes at o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/bf00177657