Recession managers and mutual fund performance

Do Mutual Fund Managers Monitor Executive Compensation?

We find significant relations between active mutual fund portfolio holdings and executive compensation, which appear to be largely driven by mutual fund investment styles rather than monitoring behaviour. Aggressive growth fund holdings are associated with performance pay, while income fund holdings are negatively related. We also find that mutual fund holdings are insensitive to changes in exe...

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes ~e.g., three percent per year! of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund’s style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted m...

Managers, Investors, and Crises: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets

Performance-Chasing Behavior and Mutual Funds: New Evidence from Multi-Fund Managers

We study managers who manage multiple mutual funds. Consistent with the idea that investors infer ability from past returns, flows into a fund are predicted by the past performance in another fund the multi-fund manager manages. The explanatory power of the other fund is stronger when it performed particularly well, when the two funds have similar styles, and when the manager has started managi...

Front - Running by Mutual Fund Managers : A Mixed Bag ?

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise traders are small investors trading through mutual funds to hedge non-tradable or illiquid assets. The insi...