Realism: Philosophical and Scientific

Stable Philosophical Systems and Radical Anti-realism

The target of this paper is twofold. The first part develops firstly a very general and abstract topic, by describing what philosophy of logic is, when it is embedded in a genuine philosophical system, and it secondly provides an explanation of the reason why intuitionism, assumed as genuine philosophical system, is in total harmony with the contemporary intuitionistic formal logic. This part e...

Scientific and Theological Realism

In this paper I shall explore the parallels and contrasts between scientific and theological realism. I shall start by providing an outline of the various aspects of scientific realism before looking at these in more detail and in comparison to theological realism. I hope that by this comparison with the well-developed debates between various species of scientific antirealists and realists, tha...

Inconsistency and scientific realism

I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, ...

Incommensurability and Scientific Realism

Scientific realism and ontology

Economists customarily talk about the ‘realism’ of economic models and of their assumptions and make descriptive and prescriptive judgements about them: this model has more realism in it than that, the realism of assumptions does not matter, and so on. This is not the way philosophers mostly use the term ‘realism’ thus there is a major terminological discontinuity between the two disciplines. T...